Torts by Eden, Clarence J.
SMU Law Review
Volume 7




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation




IMPLIED WARRANTY - BOTTLED BEVERAGES
Louisiana. In the recent case of Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca-
Cola Bottling Co.' the question arose whether or not the doctrine
of implied warranty should be applied when a foreign substance
is found in a bottled beverage. The drink was purchased from a
sub-vendor, and a housefly was found in the bottle when the con-
tents were half consumed. The trial court rendered judgment for
plaintiff, but the court of appeal reversed and rendered judgment
for defendant bottling company on the basis that the plaintiff had
failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence the absence of
mishandling by middlemen. The supreme court reversed the deci-
sion of the court of appeal and affirmed the judgment of the trial
court on the basis that a prima facie case had been made out and
the element of mishandling by middlemen is a matter of defense.
The question had been decided differently by a number of the
Louisiana courts of appeal,' and Judge Hawthorne in his dis-
senting opinion pointed out the cases which have held that the
doctrine of implied warranty is not applicable when the drink is
sold in a capped bottle.' The court of appeal followed such view,
and it held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was the only basis
on which the plaintiff could recover and that it was necessary for
her to establish that the bottled drink had not been tampered with
or improperly handled after it left the bottler's possession.' It
recognized the doctrine of implied warranty, but it was of the
belief that the doctrine is applicable only in cases involving sealed
cans and packages and not when the question involves a bottled
beverage. Because it is reasonably possible for the cap to be
1221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952).
2 Day v. Hammond Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 53 So. 2d 447 (La. App. 1951) ; Nichols
v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Ltd., 46 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 1950) ; Jenkins v.
Bogalusa Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Ltd., 1 So. 2d 426 (La. App. 1941).
8 60 So. 2d at 878.
4 55 So. 2d 7 (1951).
[Vol. 7
1953] SURVEY OF SOUTHWESTERN LAW FOR 1952 397
removed and replaced after the bottle leaves the possession of the
manufacturer, the courts of appeal in a number of cases had
held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is the basis for the
cause of action, which is the same as when the beverage bottle
explodes.'
The majority opinion cited the case of Dye v. American Bever-
age Co.,6 a decision of a court of appeal, in which the following
rule was stated:
Where the plaintiff shows by a preponderance of evidence that the
beverage contained a foreign substance... the burden of proof
shifts to the defendant to excuse itself from liability by proving to
the satisfaction of the court that the foreign matter did not enter
the beverage during the bottling or manufacturing process.7
In the case of Mayerhe/er v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co.'
the supreme court declared that it was applying the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur and that the plaintiff had satisfied all of the
required elements by establishing that the bottle was in the same
physical condition when sold to plaintiff as when delivered by
defendant's agent. However, in that case the court in effect was
applying the doctrine of implied warranty, and it quoted from
the Dye case to the effect that the question of tampering with the
container was a defensive matter. The Le Blanc case should settle
the conflict that has existed in Louisiana on the question of im-
plied warranty as to bottled beverages.
The majority opinion is supported by the weight of authority
in those states which apply the doctrine of implied warranty in
cases involving foreign substance in food drink.9 However, the
dissenting opinion may possibly be the better view when the ques-
tion concerns bottled beverages.' The cap on a bottle does not
5 Cases cited supra note 2.
6 194 So. 438 (La. App. 1940).
7 Id. at 440.
8 219 La. 320, 52 So. 2d 866 (1951).
9 See Notes, 111 A.L.R. 1251 (1937), 142 A.L.R. 1479 (1943).
10 See Note, 171 A.L.R. 1209 (1947).
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seal the container in a permanent manner as does a sealed can.
With the cap being very susceptible to being removed and re-
placed without detection, a better view would be to apply the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and require the plaintiff to prove
the absence of mishandling by middlemen.
GROSS NEGLIGENCE-SPEEDING As SOLE BASIS
Texas. In Burt v. Lochausen" an insurance agent, while carry-
ing an applicant home, lost control of his car. The applicant was
killed, and action was brought against the insurance company and
against the agent. From the fact situation the courts agreed, as a
matter of law, that the applicant was a "guest" within the auto-
mobile guest statute,12 and they agreed there was no liability on
the part of the insurance company. The jury found for the plain-
tiff on the issue of gross negligence, but the trial court sustained
a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto. The court of civil
appeals sustained the judgment for defendant, but the supreme
court reversed and rendered judgment for plaintiff on the grounds
there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Garwood pointed out the
inconsistency in the court's decision on the question of gross neg-
ligence as a matter of law. In Rogers v. Blake1" the defendant at
night-time drove through a stop sign at an intersection without
stopping, with knowledge of the location of the sign and at a
speed greater than circumstances would warrant because of auto-
mobiles approaching the intersection at right angles to him, which
automobiles he saw or should have seen. The court held as a
matter of law there was no gross negligence. In the Lochausen case
the defendant was driving approximately twenty miles an hour in
excess of the speed limit along a four-lane highway, and he had
just passed a van truck going in the same direction when he
11 ----- Tex ------ 249 S. W. 2d 194 (1952).
12 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 6701b.
18 .Tex ....- , 240 S. W. 2d 1001 (1951).
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entered a left-hand curve. The right wheels ran onto the shoulder,
and the car ran into a guard rail, after which it swung to the left
crossing the highway.
It appears that the issue and finding by the jury of gross negli-
gence was predicated primarily on the factor of speeding. Al-
though the road was winding, there were no signs warning of the
curve to indicate it was unsafe to traverse the curve at a greater
than standard speed. Therefore, neither the excess speed along
the four-lane highway nor the act of the defendant in passing the
van would be sufficient to raise a presumption of conscious in-
difference to the consequences. 4 In order for a motorist's conduct
to result in a "conscious indifference to consequences" he must
know that the guest will probably be affected by the motorist's
act or omission, and the motorist must be conscious of the fact that
he is indifferent at the time and upon the occasion in question."
Mere violation of a speed standard, or mere failure to have a car
under control, even at a curve, should not of itself be reck-
lessness."6
It is not likely that the results reached by the supreme court
would be supported by the weight of authority of the states having
automobile guest statutes, although many jurisdictions would
agree." From the fact situation it appears to be a case of error of
judgment or momentary thoughtlessness and not one of heedless
or reckless disregard of the rights of others. The phrase "heed-
lessness or reckless disregard of the rights of others" conveys the
same meaning as the term "gross negligence".'" Gross negligence
is great or excessive negligence, or negligence in a very high
degree. It is an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of
care.'
9
14 Mayer v. Johnson, 148 S.W. 2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) er. dism. judgm. cor.
15Ibid.
I McQuillen v. Meyer, 213 Iowa 1366, 241 N.W. 442 (1932).
17 See Notes, 74 A.L.R. 1198 (1931), 86 A.L.R. 1145 (1933), 96 A.L.R. 1479 (1935).
18 Burt v. Lochausen- ...-- Tex ........ 249 S.W. 2d 194, 198 (1952).
19PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 260.
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In the Blake case the court held there must be something of a
continued or persistent course of action in order to render the
driver of an automobile guilty of "heedless or reckless disregard
of the rights of others" or "gross negligence". In this case there
was no evidence of any continued course of action on the part
of the defendant, only the single factor of speeding just prior to
the accident. For the court to be consistent with its holding in the
Blake case it should have held as a matter of law there was no
gross negligence.
JOINT LIABILITY FOR INDEPENDENT WRONGDOERS
Texas. A recent decision of the Texas Supreme Court resulted
in a change of the law as to the liability of wrongdoers when their
independent acts produce a single injury. In Landers v. East Texas
Salt Water Disposal Co.2" the plaintiff sought a joint and several
judgment of damages, and injunctive relief, against two defend-
ants whose independent acts allegedly caused a single injury to
his property. The two defendants, one engaged in pumping salt
water and the other engaged in pumping both oil and salt water,
allowed salt water and other waste to escape when pipe lines of
the respective companies broke on approximately the same date.
By different means and routes this waste found its way into a lake
in which the plaintiff stocked fish, killing them. The trial judge
ordered a severance after sustaining pleas in abatement of both
defendants based upon misjoinder of parties and causes of action,
but the suit seeking injunctive relief was permitted to remain on
the original docket. The cause of action for damages was dis-
missed by the court when the plaintiff declined to replead and
proceed against each defendant severally.
The court of civil appeals upheld the decision of the trial court,
and the defendants claimed, on appeal, that in refusing to replead
the plaintiff lost his right to complain of the order of dismissal.
But the supreme court pointed out that when the trial court
20 ---Tex--- , 248 S. W. 2d 731 (1952).
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ordered a severance of the cause of action, the plaintiff's case,
asserting a joint and several cause of action, was terminated just
as effectively as if it had been dismissed. The court then said the
plaintiff had a right to pursue to trial the case made by his plead-
ings, without repleading, and the important question arose whether
or not he had alleged facts in his pleadings which, if established
by evidence, would make the defendants jointly and severally
liable. The petition did not indicate there was any concert of
action or unity of design between the defendants. The rule of law
prior to this case, as set out in Sun Oil Co. v. Robicheaux,
2 1
required one of these elements before joint liability could be
imposed against tortfeasors. In that case the commission of
appeals stated the rule:
An action at law for damages for torts cannot be maintained against
several defendants jointly, when each acted independently of the
others and there was no concert or unity of design between them....
And the fact that it may be difficult to define the damages caused by
the wrongful act of each person who independently contributed to
the final result does not affect the rule.22
The supreme court pointed out that it had not adopted the
opinion of the commission of appeals in the Robicheaux case,
although the rule, as stated, had been followed by.a long line of
decisions by the lower appellate courts, and was specifically
cited and followed by the court of civil appeals in deciding the
instant case. The court recognized the fact that the rule in the
Robicheaux case is supported by respectable authority, 2 and that
with the exception of Oklahoma and Kansas24 the courts of the
country seem to be virtually unanimous in refusing to impose
joint and several liability on multiple wrongdoers who, acting
independently, produce a single injury by interfering with the use
21 23 S. W. 2d 713 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930).
22 Id. at 715.
23 See collection of cases in Notes, 9 A.L.R. 939 (1920), 35 A.L.R. 409 (1925), 91
A.L.R. 759 (1934).
24 McDaniel v. City of Cherryvale, 91 Kan. 40, 136 Pac. 899 (1913) ; Kanola Cor-
poration v. Palmer, 167 Okla. 430, 30 P. 2d 189 (1934).
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and enjoyment of a landowner's air and water.25 However, the
court said that the general rule, strictly followed, made it impos-
sible for a plaintiff, under circumstances existing in the present
case, to secure relief in the nature of damages, and it stated that
it was specifically overruling the Robicheaux case. The new rule
was stated as follows:
Where the tortious acts of two or more wrongdoers join to produce
an indivisible injury, that is, an injury which from its nature cannot
be apportioned with reasonable certainty to the individual wrong-
doers, all of the wrongdoers will be held jointly and severally liable
for the entire damages and the injured party may proceed to judg-
ment against any one separately or against all in one suit.26
In declaring the new rule, the supreme court was attempting to
correct the grave injustices which had resulted from the applica-
tion of the rule set out in the Robicheaux case. In prior cases the
plaintiff was defeated because of his inability to establish the
extent of the injury caused by each defendant, and although theo-
retically divisible, as a practical matter there was but a single
indivisible injury. A typical example of an unjust result under
the old rule is found in Tucker Oil Co. v. Matthews." The facts in
that case were similar to those in the present one, but the plaintiff
sought damages from only one defendant. The jury found dam-
ages to the plaintiff in the amount of $1,000, and it found that
seventy-five per cent of the loss was the proximate result of
defendant's negligent acts. In accordance with such finding, the
court rendered judgment for plaintiff for $750, but on appeal
plaintiff was defeated, the court saying:
... [T]here was no possible basis in the testimony for a determina-
tion of how much of the pollution of the water was caused by acts
or omissions of the defendant.... And, therefore, the judgment ren-
dered against the defendant was necessarily based on mere surmise
or suspicion and conjecture, which was no more than a mere scin-
254 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1939) § 881; 1 COOLEY, TORTS (4th ed. 1932) 283-287;
Note, 35 A.L.R. 412 (1925).
26248 S. W. 2d at 734.
27 119 S. W. 2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
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tilla of evidence, which was incompetent to support a recovery....
And since it is manifest from the record that it will be impossible for
plaintiff, on another trial, to determine how much of plaintiff's dam-
ages resulted from the alleged negligence of the defendant, separate
and apart from that caused by the pollution of the water from other
sources with which defendant had no connection, the judgment of
trial court will be reversed and judgment will be here rendered .... 28
The same fate has befallen the plaintiff in other cases under
similar circumstances.29
The general rule is that acts of independent tortfeasors, each
of which causes some damage, may not be combined to create a
joint liability for damages. The noted authority on the law of
torts, Prosser, supports the rule, and says that the test for entire
liability, when two or more tortfeasors are involved in an injury
to the plaintiff, should be the absence of any logical basis for
apportionment of the damages."0 When such basis does exist (as
where defendants' acts are separated in time) and it is possible
for the court to say that separate portions of the loss can be
attributed to each individual defendant, then neither of the de-
fendants should be liable for the damages caused by the other.
He emphasizes that difficulty of proof should not impose liability
upon either, and this problem can be met to some extent by giving
the jury a comparatively free hand. He believes that difficulty of
proof has been overstated, and he remarks that it has been said
that general evidence as to the portion each defandant has con-
tributed to the result will be sufficient to support separate ver-
dicts.3 As a last resort it may be presumed that each of the de-
fendants is equally responsible, and it should be possible to
divide the damages equally among them. 2 But from the many
28 Id. at 608.
29 Panhandle & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Wiggins, 161 S. W. 2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942)
er. ref. w. m.; Paluxy Asphalt Co. v. Helton, 144 S.W. 2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940)
er. dism. judg. cor.; Powell Salt Water Co. v. Bigham, 69 S. W. 2d 788 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1934).




decisions by the lower appellate courts in Texas in which the
plaintiff has been met with an instructed verdict, it does not
appear that such relaxed rules of evidence have found their way
into the courts of this state.
In declaring the new rule, the supreme court pointed out that
Texas courts have long imposed joint and several liability in
negligence cases where there was neither concert of action nor
unity of design. 3 In such cases the negligent acts of the defend-
ants were operating simultaneously, but in the Landers case the
plaintiff did not allege that the salt water escaping from the two
pipe lines reached the lake at the same time. However, the court
still believed that the burden of proof is just as onerous where the
defendants' acts were not operating simultaneously, and that there
is no sound reason to permit joint liability in one class of cases
and to deny it in the other.
The decision of the supreme court will alleviate the injustice
to plaintis in damage suits against independent tortfeasors who
do not act simultaneously. The important question arises: Where
will this new rule lead in fixing final liability against defendants?
A defendant is allowed contribution from his co-defendants, by
statutory provision, proportioned according to the number of
wrongdoers when the joint tortfeasors are in pari delicto.84 In
determining whether parties are in pari delicto, the law does not
seem to take note of the quantity of negligence of different joint
tortfeasors, but it has recognized a distinction in the quality of
their negligence. 5 Aside from the statute, indemnity is allowed
among the tortfeasors when one defendant breaches a duty to his
co-defendant86 or when one is an active wrongdoer and the other
is only a passive wrongdoer.8 In situations like that in the
Landers case one would hardly ever find circumstances where
88 Texas Power & Light Co. v. Stone, 84 S. W. 2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) er. ref.
84 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 2212.85 Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 345, 153 S. W. 2d 449, 451 (1941).
86 Ibid.
87 City of San Antonio v. Smith, 94 Tex. 266, 271, 59 S. W. 1109, 1111 (1900).
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indemnity would be allowed, and therefore the only relief as
between the tortfeasors would be contribution. In the event one
party were pumping waste from only one oil well and a second
party were pumping waste from one hundred oil wells, and the
combined waste found its way to the plaintiff's property, under
the application of the statute on contribution the first defendant
could not expect to recover more than one-half of the entire
liability from his co-defendant. His liability would be consider-
ably out of proportion to the risk which he created, and there
would be an injustice to allow the second tortfeasor, whose fault
was patently greater than the first, to shift the burden imposed
on him by the injured person.
A solution to the problem that would result in the least injustice
has been suggested in the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
feasors Act.8" The desirable rule is:
When there is such a disproportion of fault among joint tortfeasors
as to render inequitable an equal distribution among them of the
common liability by contribution, the relative degrees of fault of the
joint tortfeasors shall be considered in determining their pro rata
shares .... 89
In applying the rule the court would determine from the evi-
dence if an apportionment of fault should be made. In the event
an apportionment were necessary, the court would instruct the
jury to fix the relative degrees of fault.
Is it possible that the Texas courts will reach this fair result
without the aid of a statute such as that just quoted? In order
to apply such a rule it would be necessary to avoid the application
of the Texas contribution statute. The statute applies only in cases
when no such right exists under the statute or at common law. 4
0
At common law, as a general rule, joint tortfeasors had no right
88 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM LAWS
AND PROCEEDINGS (1939) 243.
89 Id. at 244.
40 See Note, 5 Southw. L. J. 356 (1951).
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of contribution among themselves."' However, it has been held
that indemnity is properly allowed where the joint tortfeasors are
not in pari delicto, as where there was no concerted action, or
where the injury has resulted from a violation of the duty which
one owes the other.42 The defendants in the Landers case were not
in pari delicto to the exent that they were not equally at fault,
nor was there any concert of action. Where there is no concerted
action, the general rule does not apply, as the parties in such case
are not in pari delicto as to each other, and as between themselves
their rights may be adjftsted in accordance with the principles of
law applicable to the relation in fact existing between them.48
Texas courts have held the principal delinquent responsible to the
co-delinquent when under the facts the parties were not equally
culpable." The Texas Supreme Court has used the doctrine in
pari delicto quite broadly in allowing indemnity as distinguished
from contribution.45 It is submitted that the courts should allow a
tortfeasor in a fact situation like that in the Landers case to take
his case out of the statutory provision for contribution and secure
an apportionment in relation to the degrees of fault.
Clarence J. Eden.
41 18 C. J. S., Contribution, § 11, p. 14.
42 Id., § 11, p. 16.
43 Vandiver v. Pollak, 97 Ala. 467, 12 So. 473 (1893) ; Skala v. Lehon, 343 Iln. 602,
175 N. E. 832 (1931) ; 1 COOLEY, TORTS (3d ed. 1906) 259.
44 10 TEx. JuR., Contribution, pp. 554, 555.
45 Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Martin, 148 Tex. 175, 222 S. W. 2d 995 (1949) ; see
Note, 4 Southw. L. J. 349 (1950).
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